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Iread with interest George Lakoff's(1986) article "A Figure of Thought," which includes the recognition of some metaphor themes or "conceptual metaphors" (i.e., "constructed OBJECT" and " CON-TAINER") that are instrumental to other conventional conceptual metaphors that he has identified, such as "IDEAS ARE FOOD" and "LIFE (or LOVE) IS A JOURNEY." The theory Lakoffd iscussed should draw attention within the area of artificial intelligence, because of what it says about metaphoric-knowledge organization. Of specific interest to me, however, ist hat his reference to the basic role of the "OBJECT" and "CONTAINER" metaphor themes is reminiscent of the spatially grounded abstract structures 1 used in the MAP computational approach to metaphor analysis (Russell 1976 (Russell , 1986 ). The MAP program, which roughly paraphrases syntactically simple, cross-modal input metaphors, is not yet integrated with certain aspects of metaphoric text processing at the higher levelthat is a focus of Lakoff'sdiscussion. However, I believe that the program can be viewed as an illustration of potential answers to questions Lakoffr aised about the role of basic conceptual metaphors such as "OBJECT" and "CONTAINER." The following comments expand this observation and relate the idea of basic conceptual metaphors to the question of verb representations in general.
Implementation of Lakoff'sc haracterizations of metaphor by computational efforts is not new. His demonstration (see Lakoff&J ohnson, 1980) of the prevalence and systematic nature of certain metaphor themes in ordinary conversation has been exploited in a computational metaphor-understanding procedure (see Carbonell, 1982) directly utilizing Lakoff'smetaphor themes. However, this approach did not address the theoretical and computational task of "getting inside" the process of metaphoric extension of verbs and nominals. This task entails a consideration of howt he concepts salient to a metaphor are, at a symbolic level, transformed in the process of (human and computational) interpretation. With this focus, I missed in Lakoff'searlier work anyattempt to explain the mappings involved in his conventional metaphors in terms of a deeper semantic analysis that may be applicable to unconventional metaphors as well. That is, there appeared to be no "bottom-up" analysis representing an attempt to identify the common ground between literal and metaphoric meaning.
In contrast to Lakoff'spast work, his recent article does relate to this kind of analysis. His reference to the basic role of the "CONTAINER" and "OBJECT" metaphor themes givesanew context to representations used in MAP.M AP formalizes metaphoric common ground in terms of abstract verbal structures that underlie these and other metaphor themes. Astate or resultant state underlying anyverbal concept is represented as a structure predicating the existence of an OBJECT (the "constructed OBJECT" metaphor theme), the quality of an existing OBJECT,o rt he LOCATION of an object. The latter is a generalization of the "CONTAINER" metaphor theme: Aperson can be metaphorically viewed as being "in" or "at" astate and, alternatively,t he state can be viewed as "within" or "having come to" ap erson. Examples are "build" for OBJECT existence (an object results) and "swallow" or "vacuum up" for LOCATION (an object enters a location).
The adoption of these low-levelmetaphoric structures can be thought of as an implemented generalization of Lakoff'se xpressed hypothesis that some metaphors, such as "OBJECT" and "LOCATION/CON-TAINER," apparently must be in the human conceptual system for other metaphors to work. From the perspective ofc omputational text understanding, these verb structures mediate the comprehension and paraphrase of a large class of linguistically expressed metaphors. This class includes not only linguistic instantiations of Lakoff'sconceptual metaphors but also of isolated or unsystematic linguistic metaphor.
Fore xample, MAP interprets the input metaphors "Theys wallowed the ideas" and "Theyv acuumed up the ideas" similarly,eventhough the former is an instance of the "IDEAS ARE FOOD" metaphor and the latter is not. The program does this by first recognizing the abstract locative relation (i.e., the "LOCATION" metaphor theme) defined in the lexicon or knowledge base as the resultant state underlying the literal senses of the verbs swallow and vacuum up. In both cases, the resultant state OBJECT BE-ATLOCATION represents the information that the main effect of swallowing is that the swallowed OBJECT is located at/in the swallower.T his abstract locative relation can then be givena ni ntermediate interpretation in the target domain, that is, the domain of the abstract object (idea), which is MENTAL. In the interpretation, the ANI-MATE concept, they, maps into the "possessor" or "haver" of the abstract concept, idea. An English reading of the intermediate representation of the present example might then be, They(i.e., their minds) started to have mental objects (of unknown nature). Al iteral target-domain interpretation, representing a more complete transformation of source-domain terms, can be achievedt hrough the choice of a target-domain verb, such as think, defined in the knowledge base as having an abstract structure that is found to match the result component of the input verb, namely OBJECT BE-ATL OCATION (mental objects are "located in" the mind). This might produce Theys tarted to think that...<natureo fi dea>. It can be seen from this example that the abstract structure, which reflects a basic conceptual metaphor,facilitates a mapping from a potentially rich metaphoric expression in which an action or state is treated as an object to a simpler literal expression in which the action or state is represented as a verbal concept.
Ad ifferent example, used by Lakofft oi llustrate interactions between certain conceptual metaphors, demonstrates further the fundamental role of the "LOCATION/CONTAINMENT" metaphor in language. Lakoffc haracterizes the statement "I am (thinking of) leaving the relationship" in terms of pieces of "folk knowledge" including the proposition that "an interpersonal relationship is a container." However, one could say more generally that any (?) verbal or attributive concept can be treated as a container or a location through the appropriate syntactic expression. For example, "Wel ive in hope" also expresses metaphoric containment, yet hope does not share certain other aspects of a relationship as used in Lakoff'se xample. MAP handles all these examples consistently through the general assumption that the "LOCATION/CON-TAINER" metaphor (as in "in hope"), is a means of linking people to abstract attributes and actions of any kind for the purpose of linguistic expression. For "I am leaving the relationship," the program finds that the literal sense of leave has the result component 'NOT( OBJECT BE-ATL OCATION). This time the OBJECT, I, rather than the LOCATION is ANIMATE, and therefore becomes the possessor in the intermediate representation of the result, which reads In ol onger have the relationship /( e.g.) love, or literally, I no longer relate to/love....
If we turn from the "LOCATION/CONTAINER" metaphor to the "(constructed)
OBJECT" metaphor, the abstract result structure for "Web uilt our relationship" is OBJECT (= relationship) BE. The inclusion of we as the AGENT causing the resultant state givest he intermediate reading We caused our relationship to exist; the literal form might be, We started relating. Asecond type of "OBJECT" metaphor,with a focus on quality or attributes rather than construction, is illustrated by the example, "The relationship blossomed." Here, the intermediate form corresponds to The relationship changed in a positive way; the literal form might be Someone related to [?] better.
In this computational approach to text comprehension, then, interpretations are mediated by abstract verb structures hypothesized to underlie literal verbs and anyt arget-domain terms approximated by metaphoric extensions of these verbs. These abstract representations, based on the "OBJECT" and "LOCA-TION/CONTAINER" metaphors, are not truly literal for the target domain of the input. As abstract metaphors, however, these representations can be thought of as partial transformations from source-domain terms to target-domain terms. At the same time, theycategorize verbs across domains, and therefore play a fundamental organizing role in the computational interpretation of both conventional and unconventional linguistic metaphor.
2 Givent hese basic metaphoric formulations of actions and states (i.e., the "VERBAL CONCEPTS ARE ABSTRACT STRUCTURES" metaphor), the program simply relates these to literal verbal or attributive forms. Converting abstract OBJECTs and LOCATIONs into literal verbs in the process of computer interpretations can be seen as the reverse of that preliminary step of metaphor creation that, for example, makes "objects" of "thinking" or "loving" so that these concepts, realized syntactically as nouns, can be "swallowed," can "drift," and so on. It is at the leveloflanguage representation itself, then, that the MAP implementation can be seen as a generalization of an observation that Lakoffe xplores theoretically--i.e., that the "LOCATION" and "OBJECT" metaphor themes makeother,richer metaphors possible.
Af urther observation about the basic character of the "OBJECT" and "LOCATION" metaphors concerns other attempts to describe analytically what verbal concepts mean. Ve rb descriptions proposed in various disciplines often involveunits such as "objects" and "relations" (sometimes expressed as various kinds of "cases" or labeled arrows). In MAP,the formulation of these units in terms that are explicitly spatial or locative isanacknowledgment of the way we metaphorically extend object construction and location to talk about concepts in various nonspatial domains. As these structures represent verbal states with OBJECT and LOCATION "slots" or "roles" to be filled by nouns representing dependent objects, theyc ould be viewed as abstracted conceptual case configurations. Because specific domains are "factored out" of the structures, 3 this system unifies some of Fillmore's( 1968) cases; it also unifies Schank's( 1975) conceptual cases and some of his primitive ACTs/STAT Es, most notably his obviously analogous ACTs of TRANSition. In contrast to the representations of Fillmore and Schank, these structures are extensible, that is, they can consistently represent part of the common ground of a verbal metaphor.
Such abstract descriptions constitute a simple formalization of the ways that our language serves as a spatial or object-oriented filter for the world. (Sentences in which this spatial orientation is particularly obvious are provided in Reddy's(1979) discussion of the "conduit metaphor.") The fact that a verbal structure can be extended between conceptually different domains means that it serves as a filter for viewing all those domains. These spatial filters may not seem to get at the precise meaning of a concept in a nonspatial target domain. However, asone soon finds out in the course of computational efforts, there is often no way to express evenar elatively mundane cross-modal metaphor with all its subtleties (such as "He vacuumed up the ideas") in terms that are truly literal for the target domain. We can only reduce such metaphors to more basic metaphors or filters that appear to be literal.
To summarize, the emergence of the "OBJECT" and "LOCATION/CONTAINER" metaphors in the development of Lakoff'st heory has an interesting correspondence with the computational representation choice used in MAP.L akoff'so bservations about the dependence of some conceptual metaphors on more basic conceptual metaphors should be of interest to designers of computational models of language that are intended to be thought based rather than word based. In MAP,t he criterion of generality has led to the adoption of abstract structures implicitly based on the "OBJECT" and "LOCATION" metaphors. These verbal-concept structures can be viewed as conceptual metaphors that filter conceptually different domains, thereby mediating comprehensible extensions between the domains. If the assumption underlying this approach is correct, then the "OBJECT" and "CONTAINER/LOCATION" metaphors may have ane ven wider significance in the human conceptual system than Lakoffsuggests.
